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War and Global Public Reason 
JEREMY WILLIAMS 
University of Birmingham 
 
This paper offers a new critical evaluation of the Rawlsian model of global public reason 
(‘GPR’), focusing on its ability to serve as a normative standard for guiding international 
diplomacy and deliberation in matters of war. My thesis is that, where war is concerned, the 
model manifests two fatal weaknesses. First, because it demands extensive neutrality over the 
moral status of persons – and in particular over whether they possess equal basic worth or 
value – out of respect for the beliefs of inegalitarian yet ‘decent’ societies, or ‘peoples’, 
Rawlsian GPR renders calculations of proportionality in war impossible. Second, because its 
content is provided by a conception of global justice (the so-called ‘Law of Peoples’) whose 
injunctions are addressed exclusively to peoples, as corporate agents, Rawlsian GPR pushes 
the moral evaluation of the independent wartime choices of individuals off the agenda of the 
global public forum altogether. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Public reason views, generally speaking, hold that the social and political order must, 
if it is to enjoy normative legitimacy or authority, be justified to those over whom it is 
imposed, in terms that they can reasonably accept. Global public reason views, more 
specifically, hold that international relations, institutions, and law must be justified 
from the perspectives of the reasonable members of the global community. Oddly, in 
the otherwise rich and rapidly-expanding public reason literature, global public reason 
(hereinafter ‘GPR’) is rarely discussed. The contemporary locus classicus for a theory of 
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GPR remains Rawls’s The Law of Peoples. 1  And even Rawls’s theory has received 
surprisingly little attention – both relative to other aspects of the position on 
international justice and legitimacy staked out in LoP (such as Rawls’s rejection of 
egalitarian global redistribution, and view of the function and content of universal 
human rights), and especially relative to his profoundly influential account, in Political 
Liberalism, of the domestic public reason of a liberal society (hereinafter ‘LPR’).2 
If we aim to make progress in understanding the neglected idea of GPR, the 
Rawlsian model remains the natural starting point. This paper offers a new critical 
evaluation of Rawlsian GPR, focusing not on its appeal as an abstract moral ideal, but 
rather on its practical implications. More specifically, the paper evaluates Rawlsian 
GPR’s ability to serve as a normative standard for guiding international diplomacy 
and deliberation in matters of war. I argue that the model is fatally undermined by its 
implications in this area. 
Rawls's conception of GPR is part of his blueprint for a ‘realistically utopian’ 
world order, centring upon a peaceful, cooperative confederation of societies, or 
‘peoples’, called the ‘Society of Peoples’. Membership of the Society of Peoples is 
open to all peoples that are reasonable, in the twofold sense of being (a) at least 
‘decent’, if not liberal, in their attitude to and treatment of their own citizens, and (b) 
willing to recognize their fellow peoples as free and equal, and cooperate with them 
on fair and mutually-acceptable terms.3 Reasonable peoples, so understood, are taken 
                                                        
1 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, with ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (Cambridge, MA, 1999), 
hereinafter ‘LoP’. Page references in the text are all to this work. 
2 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edn. (New York, 2005). 
3  The conditions of reasonableness for a people are distinct, then, from Rawls’s conditions of 
reasonableness for a liberal citizen (for which see Political Liberalism, pp. 48-66). The term ‘reasonable’ 
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to endorse a moral ideal of GPR, under which, when justifying their foreign policies, 
and proposing or debating terms of global cooperation, the political representatives 
of a people must appeal only to reasons that their fellow peoples, despite their 
reasonable cultural differences, are able to share.4  Accordingly, as is the case for 
citizens employing LPR in their domestic deliberations, the arguments that the 
representatives of peoples offer each other in GPR cannot presuppose the truth of 
any particular ‘comprehensive doctrine’, or part thereof, such as a contentious 
metaphysical theory or conception of the good. In addition, however, and unlike in 
the case of LPR, their arguments cannot presuppose moral ideas distinctive of liberal 
justice, such as, paradigmatically, the idea of the fundamental freedom and equality of 
persons. For under the ideal of GPR, to do so would represent a failure of proper 
toleration and respect towards decent societies that reasonably reject those 
commitments. Instead, then, the justifications adduced in GPR must be framed 
wholly within the terms of the eponymous ‘Law of Peoples’ - a conception of 
international justice which is comprised, according to Rawls, of concepts, values and 
principles that are familiar aspects of the global public culture, endorsed by liberal 
and decent peoples alike, and which ‘asks of other societies only what they can 
reasonably grant without submitting to a position of inferiority or domination’ (p. 
121). 
The Law of Peoples revolves around eight core principles, specifying what 
                                                                                                                                                              
always refers herein to Rawls’s notion of global reasonableness, unless otherwise noted. I analyse this 
notion more closely in section II. 
4 The ideal of GPR also calls on liberal citizens to ‘repudiate government officials and candidates for 
public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples’ (LoP, p. 57). My focus, however, 
is on GPR as employed at the global level. 
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peoples, as collective agents acting through their institutions, may and must do, and 
their rights in respect of each other. Of these principles, the fifth concerns limits on a 
people’s right to resort to war, and the seventh concerns the constraints which a 
people must observe on the means employed during war – in short, requirements of 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The reason these principles are needed, note, is not that 
reasonable peoples are in danger of going to war with each other, but rather that, 
outside the ideal case in which all global agents are reasonable, there will continue to 
exist so-called ‘outlaw states’, which cannot be relied upon not to act aggressively in 
pursuit of their rational interests, or abstain from internal repression severe enough to 
warrant humanitarian intervention. Faced with the threat to global stability posed by 
such regimes, reasonable peoples must reach agreement in two key areas: first, how 
to more specifically interpret the demands of the abstract war principles of the Law 
of Peoples, and determine when violations have taken place; and second, the terms of 
their joint responses towards violators of the Law of Peoples, whether diplomatic, 
economic, or military. Both of these debates must be conducted within the terms of 
GPR, and represent a test of its adequacy. 
My thesis will be that, where war is concerned, Rawlsian GPR manifests two 
fatal weaknesses. First, because it demands extensive neutrality over the moral status 
of persons – and in particular over whether they possess equal basic worth or value – 
out of respect for the beliefs of decent inegalitarian peoples, Rawlsian GPR renders 
calculations of proportionality in war (and therefore assessments of the overall 
justness of wars, or acts of war) impossible. Second, because the injunctions of the 
Law of Peoples are addressed exclusively to peoples, as corporate agents, Rawlsian 
GPR pushes the moral evaluation of the independent wartime choices of individuals 
off the agenda of the global public forum altogether. I exhibit these weaknesses in, 
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respectively, sections IV and V. The first is a problem of indeterminacy in GPR – that 
is, of its failing to furnish deliberators with the conceptual and argumentative 
resources needed to reach a concrete conclusion to a political question.5 The second 
is also, in one sense, a problem of GPR’s failing to offer determinate guidance where 
(and to whom) it is needed. But it is also, viewed another way, a problem of GPR’s 
saying something concrete but ethically unacceptable – that the moral assessment of 
individual conduct in war is a matter of merely sectarian (rather than genuinely global 
and public) concern. 
These two problems might both aptly be described as ways in which Rawlsian 
GPR is incomplete. Indeed, to do so seems in keeping with Rawls’s own terminology. 
Rawls says (p. 86) that the completeness of the Law of Peoples, as the basis of GPR, 
is a matter of its giving us ‘reasonable political principles for all politically relevant 
subjects’, with ‘reasonable’ meaning, in this particular context, capable of being 
endorsed on due reflection, or in reflective equilibrium. By Rawls’s lights, then, 
completeness appears to require that GPR provide deliberators with sufficient 
reasons to draw political conclusions that are not only determinate, but morally 
acceptable. In the contemporary literature, however, ‘incompleteness’ has acquired a 
narrower meaning: conceptions of public reason that require restraint in the 
proffering of reasons are now standardly described as subject to an incompleteness 
objection specifically in so far as the restraint thwarts decision-making.6 This paper 
                                                        
5  I use the term ‘indeterminacy’ advisedly, in keeping with Gerald Gaus’s influential distinction 
between ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘inconclusiveness’ in public reason. For explanation, see the text around 
note 27, below. 
6 See e.g. the overview of that objection in Jonathan Quong, ‘Public Reason’, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/public-reason/> (2013). 
 6 
deploys the incompleteness objection, thus narrowly defined, against Rawlsian GPR 
(for the first time, I believe), but also goes beyond it. And it may be helpful, then, to 
use a separate label to denote the distinct objection that a conception of public 
reason generates, or fails to provide the argumentative resources needed to resist, 
morally unacceptable conclusions. I have elsewhere referred to this, in the context of 
LPR, as the ethical objection.7 
To establish that Rawlsian GPR is indeed subject to the foregoing objections, 
we require an account of its content - that is, of the total stock of ideas and arguments 
on which its practitioners are permitted to draw when engaging in international 
deliberation. I provide an overall such account in section II. Section III then homes 
in more closely on GPR’s war-related content, highlighting an initial concern 
regarding the scope of the ‘supreme emergency exemption’ from the principle of 
distinction for which the Law of Peoples provides. Sections IV and V turn to my 
central objections. 
This critique of Rawlsian GPR is, of course, grist to the mill of opponents of 
public reason approaches in general (of whom I am one). Yet my argument on this 
occasion is not necessarily unhelpful to the public reason cause either, precisely in 
that it identifies features that a successful theory of GPR (if one exists) would not 
possess. It lies beyond the paper’s scope to determine whether some alternative 
model of GPR could more successfully handle the issues raised by war.8 A fortiori, 
                                                        
7 See my ‘Public Reason and Prenatal Moral Status’, Journal of Ethics 19 (2015), pp. 23-52, at 49. 
8  For such an alternative, see e.g. Gerald Gaus’s remarks on the worldwide application of his 
‘convergence’ conception of public reason, in The Order of Public Reason (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 470-9. 
As it happens, in new work, Christopher Eberle argues that convergence liberalism also carries 
unwelcome implications regarding war; see his ‘War and Respect’, in Rawls and Religion, eds. Tom 
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determining whether we should reject the idea of GPR altogether would require 
further work. 
 
II. THE CONTENT OF GLOBAL PUBLIC REASON 
I begin, to reiterate, with an account of the content of Rawlsian GPR (from now on, 
note, ‘GPR’ always refers to Rawlsian GPR, unless otherwise specified). It seems 
helpful to proceed by comparison with Rawls’s more familiar idea of LPR. Rawls 
describes the content of LPR as being ‘given by the principles and values of the 
family of liberal political conceptions of justice’ (p. 143). ‘To engage in [liberal] public 
reason’, Rawls adds, ‘is to appeal to one of these political conceptions – to their ideals 
and principles, standards and values - when debating fundamental political questions.’ 
Notice that a family of such conceptions provides the content of LPR: when engaging 
in public justification, liberal citizens are permitted to draw on any conception within 
that family, whether or not all their fellow citizens accept it. The content of GPR, 
meanwhile, is significantly more constrained. It is provided not by any family of 
conceptions of international justice, but by a single conception – the Law of Peoples. 
 Rawls explicitly contrasts the content of LPR, as provided by a family of 
conceptions of justice, with that of GPR, as provided by the Law of Peoples alone (p. 
57). The reason other conceptions of global justice are not to be introduced into 
GPR is apparently that the Law of Peoples is unique in being reasonably acceptable 
                                                                                                                                                              
Bailey and Valentina Gentile (New York, 2015), pp. 29-51, at 43-7. For doubts about whether 
Eberle’s war-based critique of convergence succeeds, see my ‘Review of Rawls and Religion’, Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews, <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/59524-rawls-and-religion/> (2015). 
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to the diverse societies who comprise the international justificatory community.9 This 
is in contrast with the domestic case, where Rawls allows that there are ‘many 
liberalisms’ which citizens can agree are at least reasonable (even if not the most 
reasonable), among which his own ‘justice as fairness’, ‘whatever its merits, is but 
one’ (p. 141). 
 To inquire into the content of GPR, then, is to inquire into the content of the 
Law of Peoples. The latter is, as noted earlier, based around eight ‘familiar and 
traditional’ principles of international relations, which Rawls calls its ‘basic charter’ (p. 
37). They are: 
 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other 
than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. 
 
                                                        
9  Thus, Rawls writes (LoP, p. 85): ‘I have argued that both reasonably just liberal and decent 
hierarchical peoples would accept the same Law of Peoples. For this reason, political debate among 
peoples concerning their mutual relations should be expressed in terms of the content and principles 
of that law.’ 
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There is more, however, to the Law of Peoples than the basic charter. For as Rawls 
acknowledges, the charter is not a sufficiently detailed guide to the conduct of 
peoples without considerable further embellishment. For instance, immediately upon 
setting out the basic charter, Rawls notes (p. 37) that the fourth principle (and, we 
might add, the fifth) requires qualification to allow for other-defensive action, 
including humanitarian intervention in outlaw states. And he says that further 
principles will be needed to govern, for example, ‘forming and regulating federations 
(associations) of peoples, and standards of fairness for trade and other cooperative 
institutions’ (p. 38). Given the multiple ways in which the further development of the 
basic charter might be accomplished, Rawls tells us that ‘there is no single possible 
Law of Peoples, but rather a family of reasonable such laws… satisfying the 
representatives of peoples who will be determining the specifics of the law’ (p. 4 n4). 
And he distinguishes between what is the case under ‘a Law of Peoples’ – i.e. on 
some specific interpretation of that conception of justice – and what is the case under 
‘the Law of Peoples’ – i.e. under any of its eligible interpretations. Consequently, the 
parallel between the respective contents of LPR and GPR is somewhat closer than it 
initially appears: although participants in GPR may only appeal to one conception of 
global justice, there nonetheless exists a family of interpretations of that conception on 
which they may draw. In further laying out the content of GPR, then, I shall focus on 
identifying the essential features of the Law of Peoples – those that will be preserved 
in any valid interpretation that might be adduced in the global public forum. 
To begin: Rawls stresses that the status of the Law of Peoples as the basis of 
GPR depends upon its being a political conception of global justice. In virtue of what 
characteristics, however, does a conception of global justice count as political? In 
Political Liberalism, Rawls says that a conception of domestic justice is political if and 
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only if it meets three criteria: (a) its principles apply primarily to society’s major 
institutions, or ‘basic structure’; (b) it can be presented in a way that is ‘freestanding’ 
of the comprehensive doctrines over which reasonable liberal citizens disagree; and 
relatedly (c) it is derived entirely from fundamental ideas taken from liberal-
democratic public culture, that any reasonable citizen can be expected to share.10 In 
LoP, Rawls does not explicitly return to or amend this definition of the political for 
purposes of classifying conceptions of global justice. But it seems clear that he 
regards the Law of Peoples as political in that it satisfies analogues of the foregoing 
criteria: (a) it governs what he calls (e.g. at p. 33) the ‘basic structure of the relations 
between peoples’ - that is, international law, and various cooperative organisations, 
such as military alliances, free trade areas, federal unions, and so on; (b) it does not 
presuppose the truth or validity of any of the comprehensive doctrines or 
conceptions of justice according to which the reasonable members of the Society of 
Peoples order their internal affairs; (c) it is worked up from normative ideas shared 
by reasonable peoples, as found in their common global public culture, or the ‘history 
and usages of international law and practice’ (p. 41). The content of GPR, then, is 
composed of interpretations of the Law of Peoples that preserve these political-
making features. 
Now, let us look further criterion (c′), on which the Law of Peoples must be 
based on ideas shared by reasonable peoples. 11  Since any publicly admissible 
                                                        
10 Political Liberalism, pp. 11-15. 
11 The caveat that the relevant features of the global public culture be shared is vital. Some parts of 
the current global public culture are excluded from GPR, because they would not be endorsed by all 
reasonable peoples. Thus, for instance, while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of 
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interpretation of the Law of Peoples must conform to (c′), we can go deeper in 
specifying GPR’s content by isolating the common normative commitments of 
reasonable peoples, as Rawls defines them. 
In order to qualify as reasonable, a people must, Rawls says, accept and 
honour certain moral commitments regarding both their fellow peoples and their 
own members. He suggests that societies meeting these conditions ought to be 
admitted as full members of the Society of Peoples, and given justifications they can 
accept for the shape of the global order, both on grounds that they have ‘certain 
institutional features that deserve respect’, and on grounds that doing so is required 
for achieving durable peace in a pluralistic world (p. 84).12 
Consider first how reasonable peoples are defined as viewing each other: as 
free and equal participants in a scheme of global cooperation, entitled to cooperative 
terms that are both fair and mutually justifiable (see, e.g., pp. 34-5). Reasonable 
peoples, in other words, are committed to political values of freedom, equality, fairness, 
and public reason among peoples – analogues of the values of interpersonal freedom, 
equality, etc. to which reasonable citizens in a political liberal state subscribe. These 
global values are depicted by Rawls as moral cornerstones of the Law of Peoples, and 
thus of GPR. 
Regarding their own members, meanwhile, reasonable peoples hold moral 
beliefs that qualify them as at least ‘decent’, if not necessarily liberal. A decent people 
                                                                                                                                                              
this culture, not all of its provisions provide public reasons, according to Rawls, since some decent 
peoples reject them. On this, see LoP, p. 80 n23.  
12  For close analysis of the basis of Rawls’s understandings of international toleration and 
reasonableness, see Thomas Porter, ‘Rawls, Reasonableness, and International Toleration’, Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics 11 (2012), pp. 382-414.  
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accepts, first, that all its members have at least basic human rights against their 
government, where human rights constitute ‘a special class of urgent rights, such as 
freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and 
security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide’ (p. 79). A decent people 
also accepts that its members should all be included somehow in the scheme of social 
cooperation, that they should be governed according to a ‘common good’ conception 
of justice that takes everyone’s interests into account to some degree (though not 
necessarily an equal degree), and that their views be given a measure of political 
representation - if not directly then through a ‘decent consultation hierarchy’ (see pp. 
65-75). The content of GPR also includes, then, a shared idea of human rights, and 
of decency, understood according to the foregoing standards. 
Decent peoples need not accept, however, that their members should have the 
extensive equal rights and liberties that liberalism prescribes, such as full liberty of 
conscience and association, sexual and reproductive freedom, and rights to vote and 
seek public office. Nor need they accept, more foundationally, that their members 
have the moral status of free and equal persons (p. 68). Accordingly, a people is not 
unreasonable by Rawlsian lights in adhering to a conception of domestic justice under 
which a wide range of non-basic rights are accorded only to certain favoured groups 
– males, say, or members of the official religion. And it is also fully consistent with 
Rawlsian decency for a people to hold that infringements of the basic human rights 
and associated interests of some of its members are more morally grave or tragic, and 
to be condemned, punished, and guarded against more strenuously, than those of 
others. For as we have just seen, the criteria of decency specify only that peoples 
must honour their members’ human rights, and give weight to their interests and 
perspectives, not that they must do so equally. By that token, then, it is reasonable not 
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merely for a people to, say, deny women the vote, or gay people the liberty to engage 
in sexual relations (to mention two policies that involve abridging liberal rights but 
not basic Rawlsian human rights), but also for it to, say, impose harsher legal 
penalties for the murder or enslavement of those to whom the official doctrine 
accords privileged status (at least assuming the human rights of each are protected to 
an adequate minimum degree).13 
In short, as Samuel Freeman puts it, ‘[i]t is not a condition of a decent society 
that it affirm the equality of its members or give them equal political rights … or 
even that it provide for equality of all basic human rights.’14 The upshot of this, for 
the content of GPR, is that doctrines and arguments affirming the fundamental 
freedom and equality of persons, and the equal importance of their basic rights and 
interests, have nonpublic status, and may not be invoked in international deliberation 
and justification. Liberal societies may try to persuade their non-liberal counterparts 
that greater equality would be in their interests as peoples. But they may not claim, 
consonant with the rules of GPR, that decent peoples are mistaken about the moral 
worth of their citizens. 
                                                        
13 This conclusion might be queried, on grounds that Rawls claims at one point (LoP, p. 65) that there 
is a human right to ‘formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar 
cases be treated similarly).’ On whose authority, however, are two cases to be judged relevantly 
similar? I believe that Rawls can only coherently claim that formal equality is a human right if that 
authority is understood to rest with the society in question. For if it were not so interpreted, the right 
would immediately lead to equal liberal citizenship, ruling out the conceptual possibility of a non-
liberal, decent people that respects human rights. Yet, if formal equality is interpreted as I suggest, it 
rules out merely arbitrariness and corruption in the enforcement of human rights, not the sort of 
systematic inequality described in the text. 
14 Samuel Freeman, Rawls (Abingdon, 2007), p. 430. 
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The fact that the liberal and non-liberal members of the global justificatory 
community share an understanding of the moral status of their fellow peoples, but 
not of the person, also accounts for two further distinctive features of the Law of 
Peoples – its contractualism, and composition in terms of principles specifying duties 
for peoples, rather than duties which persons across borders owe directly to each 
other. Consider first its contractualist nature. According to Rawls, the allegiance of 
reasonable peoples to the abstract political values of freedom, equality, and fair 
cooperation among peoples will also lead them, more concretely, to agree that the 
appropriate perspective from which to endorse, interpret and refine the principles of 
the Law of Peoples is that of a global original position, wherein agreement is brokered 
between representatives of peoples who have an equal say and veto, irrespective of 
their geographical sizes, populations, conceptions of internal justice, and levels of 
wealth and power (which differences between them are obscured behind a veil of 
ignorance).15 In the global original position, as Rawls depicts it, the representatives of 
peoples are not modelled as facing a choice between the Law of Peoples and 
alternative conceptions of global justice. Rather, they ‘simply reflect on the 
advantages of these principles of equality among peoples and see no reason to depart 
from them’ (p. 41). They also select, however, between more fine-grained 
interpretations of the Law of Peoples. In Rawls’s words, ‘[i]n the Law of Peoples the 
many difficulties of interpreting the eight principles… take the place of the 
arguments for first principles in the domestic case. The problem of how to interpret 
these principles can always be raised and is to be debated from the point of view of 
                                                        
15 See LoP, p. 69 for the claim that decent and liberal peoples alike endorse the global original position 
as fair. Technically, Rawls describes two global original positions, in which liberal and decent peoples 
separately appraise the Law of Peoples. This detail becomes relevant in section IV. 
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the second-level [i.e. global] original position’ (p. 42). 
Consider next what may be described as the ‘statist’ or ‘corporatist’ character 
of the Law of Peoples. As we have seen, the principles of the Law of Peoples are 
framed in terms of what politically-organized peoples, not individuals, may and must 
do. Rawls says variously of the Law of Peoples that ‘its principles are addressed to 
peoples as peoples’ (p. 55), that it ‘applies to how peoples treat each other as peoples’ 
(p. 81), and that ‘it conceives of liberal democratic peoples (and decent peoples) as 
the actors in the Society of Peoples, just as citizens are the actors in domestic society’ 
(p. 23). He recognizes, moreover, that we will naturally want to know why the Law of 
Peoples is so structured: ‘What is it about peoples’, Rawls asks (p. 17 n9) on our 
behalf, ‘that gives them the status of the (moral) actors in the Law of Peoples?’ 
Unfortunately, Rawls’s answer to this question is somewhat oblique. He 
advises us (p. 17 n9) that the answer is contained - along with an answer to the 
related question, ‘Why does the Law of Peoples use an original position… that is fair 
to peoples and not to individual persons?’ - in §11 of LoP. Yet there only the latter 
question is explicitly addressed. The substance of §11, however, is a rejection of 
cosmopolitanism, on grounds that it presupposes an egalitarian conception of the 
person that is unacceptable to decent peoples. And this suggests an implicit answer to 
the question why the Law of Peoples consists of principles enjoining action from 
peoples rather than persons, as follows. First, any conception of justice specifying 
duties which individuals owe to each other globally must perforce take a stand on 
whether persons matter equally from the moral point of view, since otherwise we will 
be unable to determine how much each is required to sacrifice for the sake of the 
interests of others. Yet, in the absence of agreement on that issue, no conception of 
global justice that extends to global interpersonal relations can be based entirely on 
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moral commitments shared by liberal and decent peoples. Those peoples do, 
however agree that their fellow peoples are free and equal, and that their interests merit 
equal consideration. Hence, in the name of mutual acceptability to decent and liberal 
peoples, the Law of Peoples is restricted to specifying the terms of relations between 
peoples, leaving peoples to treat their own citizens in accordance with their own 
reasonable conceptions of domestic justice. 
To sum up, the content of GPR is provided by a family of interpretations of 
the Law of Peoples – a contractualist conception of global justice that Rawls takes to 
embody political values of (inter alia) freedom and equality between societies that 
reasonable peoples share. The freedom and equality of persons, however, are values 
only for liberal peoples. And GPR therefore requires neutrality over whether the 
liberal view of the moral status of the person, or some decent non-liberal view, is 
correct. 
 
III. THE JUST WAR DOCTRINE OF THE LAW OF PEOPLES 
With the foregoing general account of the content of GPR in hand, I now turn to 
how GPR guides deliberation specifically about war. In Part III of LoP, Rawls aims, 
inter alia, to ‘work out the content of the principles of the Law of Peoples for the 
conduct of war’ (p. 91). Notice that his concern is with the principles of war for the 
(not merely a) Law of Peoples. The elements of just war theory presented are, in 
other words, purportedly commitments of any reasonable interpretation of the Law 
of Peoples that might be raised in GPR. Rawls depicts his account of war as largely 
faithful to ‘traditional thought on the subject’ (p. 94), and in particular to 
conventional just war theory, as surveyed and distilled in Michael Walzer’s seminal 
Just and Unjust Wars (p. 95 n 8.). As we shall see, however, it is highly unconventional 
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in certain respects. In this section I set out the main outlines of the Rawlsian theory 
of war, draw out its implications for the practice of GPR, and advance an initial 
objection that I believe to be damaging, but concede not everyone would regard as 
fatal. 
 Rawls gives us only a fragment of a complete theory of the just war, leaving 
considerable scope for further debate within the international community over the 
best interpretation of the relevant principles. He touches on aspects of both jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello, thereby elaborating on the fifth and seventh principles of the 
Law of Peoples. Regarding jus ad bellum, he focuses on the circumstances under 
which, so reasonable peoples would agree, there exists just cause for war. He does 
not, however, address the way in which peoples might interpret the other traditional 
restrictions on the right to instigate war, such as the legitimate authority or necessity 
requirements. Even Rawls's discussion of just cause leaves considerable room for 
further refinement. He says that reasonable peoples abjure expansionist war, and 
accept as just causes only self-defence, other-defence, and humanitarian intervention 
(pp. 91-2). But should the Law of Peoples include, as part of the right to engage in 
defensive war, a right to go to war pre-emptively or preventatively, say, or to extract 
by force resources that are unjustly withheld by another regime?16 These questions, 
among a host of others relating to the interpretation of jus ad bellum, remain to be 
resolved through collective deliberation within the terms of GPR. 
Consider next Rawls's treatment of jus in bello, or what is sometimes called ‘the 
war convention’. It has been claimed that Rawls endorses the doctrine of the moral 
equality of combatants, whereby soldiers, on both sides of a conflict, are morally 
                                                        
16 For the view that a group’s failure to fulfil its duties of global distributive justice presents its victims 
with just cause for war, see Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford, 2012), ch. 3. 
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permitted to kill each other, and lack a right not to be killed by the enemy, 
irrespective of whether their cause is just.17 In fact, however, he does not. For where 
targeting the enemy is concerned, he only explicitly addresses the question of what 
policies reasonable peoples, as collective agents, are required to adopt, on the 
assumption that they are fighting to resist the unjust expansionism of an outlaw state. 
This is to leave aside both what targeting policies are required or permitted of the 
outlaw state in prosecution of its ex hypoethesi unjust war, and the question of what 
individual soldiers in the field may or must do.18 
Rawls suggests that reasonable peoples would accept noncombatant immunity 
as a limitation on their conduct, but could not agree to divest themselves of the 
option of killing enemy soldiers, even though they are often unwilling instruments of 
their unjust regime. ‘The reason why they may be attacked directly’, Rawls writes of 
an outlaw state’s combatants, ‘is not that they are responsible for the war, but that 
well-ordered peoples have no other choice. They cannot defend themselves in any 
other way, and defend themselves they must’ (pp. 95-6). This does not entail, 
however, that reasonable peoples would also endorse an interpretation of the Law of 
Peoples under which, once war is in progress, outlaw states are likewise permitted to 
pursue a policy of targeting enemy combatants. To be sure, it may well be that 
reasonable peoples would agree to obey, and enshrine in international law, such a 
symmetrical in bello code, rather than one in which an outlaw state is not permitted to 
authorize any attacks on the enemy, even if they respect noncombatant immunity. 
                                                        
17  See e.g. Rex Martin, ‘Just Wars and Humanitarian Interventions’, Journal of Social Philosophy 36 
(2005), pp. 439-456, at 440. 
18 As I argue in section V, this second question is not only one that Rawls omits to discuss, but one 
that GPR is incapable of addressing. 
 19 
Whether or not reasonable peoples would do so may depend, inter alia, on whether 
they, or their representatives in the original position, judge that, if outlaw states were 
denied permission to attack even enemy combatants, this would lead them to 
abandon restraint, increasing the destructiveness of war to everyone’s detriment. 
Contractualist war ethicist Yitzhak Benbaji has argued that peoples that are at least 
decent in Rawlsian terms would accept a symmetrical war convention on precisely 
these grounds. 19  Whether or not Benbaji is right, the question of whether the 
constraints of jus in bello ought to be symmetrical between reasonable peoples and 
outlaw states is one which Rawls leaves to the Society of Peoples. 
A further noteworthy aspect of Rawls’s account of the principles governing 
reasonable peoples’ conduct in war is its inclusion of a supreme emergency exemption from 
the principle of discrimination, whereby a people is permitted to intentionally attack 
civilians where necessary to save itself from an imminent threat to its survival, or that 
of the Society of Peoples (see pp. 98-101). While the idea of a supreme emergency 
exemption is itself familiar, Rawls’s treatment of it is atypical in at least two respects. 
First, whereas on the standard view targeting civilians represents an infringement of 
jus in bello - albeit sometimes a defensible one overall - under the Law of Peoples the 
exemption is a prerogative granted under the war convention itself. Second, the 
supreme emergency exemption is standardly given a lesser evil justification, under 
which the deontological constraint on targeting civilians is overridden if and only if 
the consequences of respecting it would be dramatically worse than those of 
infringing it. As part of the Law of Peoples, however, the justification behind the 
                                                        
19 See e.g. his ‘A Defense of the Traditional War Convention’, Ethics 118 (2008), pp. 464–95. Note 
that the agreement of individuals as well as of peoples plays a role in Benbaji’s case for a symmetrical 
war convention. In this respect, among others, he departs from the Rawlsian framework. 
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Rawlsian supreme emergency exemption must instead be that it would be adopted as 
part of a fair contractual agreement between reasonable peoples. 
The lesser evil and contractualist justifications carry different implications for 
the range of circumstances in which the exemption may be invoked, with the 
contractualist justification being, in an important way, more permissive. Consider the 
case of a people that cannot save itself from annihilation or enslavement except by 
targeting some number of civilians of the enemy regime that vastly exceeds its own 
population. On the lesser evil view, this people cannot claim the exemption, since it 
would thereby cause far more evil than it prevents. On the contractualist view, 
however, it seems that this people must be allowed to save itself, even at the cost of a 
much greater evil. This is because, as we saw above, reasonable peoples accept that a 
fair agreement over the principles of the Law of Peoples treats them as equal parties 
irrespective of size. Thus, when they adopt the perspective of the original position, 
Rawlsian deliberators are to imagine themselves as unaware of the size of the people 
they represent. I take it that, under those informational constraints, each party would 
rationally insist on an equal right for peoples to avail themselves of the exemption, 
whether they are populous peoples aggressed against by smaller ones, or vice versa 
(presumably subject to the different limitation that they not cause the destruction of 
more peoples than they save). For otherwise, once the veil of ignorance was lifted, 
smaller peoples might find that, notwithstanding their equal fundamental interest in 
survival as a people, they are prohibited from saving themselves under conditions in 
which a more populous people would be permitted to proceed. If this is right, GPR 
constrains deliberators to endorse this more generous prerogative. 
Those who favour the lesser evil position on targeting civilians (as, I observe, 
most contemporary war ethicists do), will find the wider exemption that GPR 
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produces unacceptable. 20  This gives us a significant initial objection to GPR’s 
handling of war. The objection, however, may not be decisive. For not everyone, I 
acknowledge, finds implausible the supposition that societies have prerogatives to 
save themselves even at much greater cost to innocent life. Notably, Walzer writes 
that, on the lesser evil view, ‘large nations and small ones would have different 
entitlements in [supreme emergency] cases, and I doubt very much that that is true.’21 
I shall, then, leave the objection that GPR takes too lax a view of supreme 
emergencies in reserve, as an extra consideration for those who are persuaded by it. 
The objections on which I concentrate now, meanwhile, should be of concern to all. 
 
IV. PROPORTIONALITY 
                                                        
20 An anonymous reviewer proposes that equality between peoples might instead be achieved by 
‘levelling down’ in setting the terms of the exemption – i.e. by stipulating a uniformly low ceiling on 
the number of civilians which a people, irrespective of size, is permitted to target as a means of saving 
itself. Given how widely the populations of peoples will differ, this ceiling would have to be very low 
to deny any people permission to cause a greater evil in exercising its exemption. And it is difficult to 
see why, in the original position, rational parties would endorse an exemption that is so tightly 
constrained. If they would, however, GPR would be subject to an objection that is the converse of 
the one advanced in the text: namely, that the exemption carved out is too strict. For the exemption 
would deny more populous peoples the ability to save themselves by targeting civilians in excess of 
the ceiling, even if doing so would clearly be the lesser evil. The fundamental point here is that 
contractualist reasoning militates against an exemption that is appropriately sensitive to the numbers 
saved and killed. Added to this, the envisaged move is subject to the general problem - discussed in 
the next section - that liberal and decent peoples disagree over the extent to which the killing of 
different groups constitutes an evil, and would therefore seem incapable of agreeing in principle how 
many civilian casualties the survival of a people should be set as worth. 
21 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th edn. (New York, 2006), p. 254. 
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To recapitulate, the just war doctrine developed by Rawls for the Law of Peoples 
contains a number of significant omissions, which are left for the Society of Peoples 
to fill in through deliberation within the constraints of GPR. One matter which 
Rawls leaves entirely aside is that of how to understand and apply the idea of 
proportionality. In the just war tradition, proportionality is a condition of both jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. And clearly, members of the Society of Peoples will need to 
know when to censure parties who initiate disproportionate wars, or employ 
disproportionate means within war. As I now argue, however, the restrictions of 
GPR leave them entirely unable to do so. 
 By ‘proportionality’, note, I shall mean the issue of whether the harm inflicted 
upon innocent civilians by some (act of) war is, or would be, excessive in relation to 
the good thereby brought about. 22  That broad-brush characterisation masks 
complexities which I cannot address within the confines of this paper, concerning 
which harms and benefits count with the proportionality calculus, and how heavily 
they should be weighted.23 For our purposes, it suffices to say that one crucially 
                                                        
22 This definition describes only half of what, according to some philosophers, proportionality is 
about – namely what McMahan calls ‘wide proportionality’ (as contrasted with ‘narrow 
proportionality’, which concerns whether the harm inflicted upon an individual exceeds that to which 
[s]he is liable). I focus on wide proportionality because, unlike narrow proportionality, it is a shared 
concern of orthodox and so-called ‘revisionist’ just war theories. I believe, however, that the argument 
in the text would also apply to narrow proportionality, mutatis mutandis. For McMahan’s distinction 
between narrow and wide proportionality, see e.g. his Killing in War (Oxford, 2009), pp. 21ff. 
23  Thus, I abstract from e.g. the problem of whether the ‘goods’ that count in (wide) in bello 
proportionality can be understood in a morally neutral way, such that proportionality can be satisfied 
by belligerents without just(ified) war aims. An anonymous reviewer invites consideration of whether 
the indeterminacy described in this section remains when the harms of war are weighted – as in the 
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relevant variable in calculations of proportionality is the moral status of war’s victims 
and beneficiaries – that is, how much they, their rights, lives and interests count for 
from the moral point of view. To be sure, just war theorists have not tended to 
examine how proportionality assessments are to be made when the good and bad 
effects of war accrue to individuals with varying moral statuses. For the orthodox 
theory factors only harms and benefits to human persons into assessments of 
proportionality, and has a cosmopolitan moral complexion, to the extent that it takes 
all persons, irrespective of group membership, to merit equal concern and respect. 
Nonetheless, just war thinking implicitly acknowledges that moral status makes a 
difference to proportionality, precisely in so far as it completely discounts the effects 
of war on nonhuman animals, on the apparent assumption that they lack significant 
moral standing.24  
 Unfortunately, however, as we have seen, GPR requires a high degree of 
neutrality over the moral status of the person, owing to the fact of disagreement over 
that question between liberal and decent peoples. And precisely because they are 
disbarred from introducing into justificatory dialogue the claim that persons have 
equal moral standing, participants in GPR will be unable to determine whether, in 
particular cases, the harms caused to some by war are morally outweighed by the 
goods thereby realized. 
 To illustrate, consider a simple Collateral Damage Case, in which liberal people L 
                                                                                                                                                              
traditional doctrine’s understanding of in bello proportionality – against the neutral currency of military 
advantage, or contribution to military success. I believe so, since the question of when belligerents are 
entitled to count their victory as a good is separate from the question of how heavily that good weighs 
in the scales vis-à-vis harms to the enemy, given their relative moral standing. 
24 I am grateful to Jeff McMahan for that point. 
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is fighting a just war of self-defence against outlaw society O. L, suppose, faces the 
choice whether to launch an aerial raid that will cripple O’s offensive capabilities, 
saving the lives of some large number of civiliansL, while collaterally killing some 
smaller number of civiliansO. Suppose that if the lives of each civilianL and civilianO 
were given equal weight (as L, in light of its liberal convictions, takes to be the case), 
L’s bombing would be proportionate. Suppose also, however, that according to the 
prevailing religious doctrine of some decent member of the Society of Peoples, D, 
the lives of civiliansL are worth less than those of civiliansO, such that the raid would 
fall foul of proportionality (perhaps, for instance, D holds that civiliansL are of lesser 
value than civiliansO on grounds that they do not follow the true religion). The 
representatives of D cannot, of course, press for the Society of Peoples to censure L 
for violating proportionality without transgressing the terms of GPR, since their view 
presupposes the truth of their unshared doctrine. Yet by the same token, L’s 
egalitarian view also relies on what are, under the rules of GPR, nonpublic 
considerations. Neither D nor L can claim that their conclusions about 
proportionality are or could be derived entirely out of moral reasons native to GPR. 
Thus, GPR is indeterminate on the question of whether L’s act violates proportionality 
- it cannot provide the route to any answer to it. It is simply not possible to do the 
moral accounting without taking a stand on whether those who will be killed if the 
bombing does and does not go ahead are, one for one, of equal worth. 
It is strange that Rawls would apparently not have noticed, in the context of 
war, that one cannot evaluate whether a given allocation of harms and benefits is 
morally permissible (or required) without first determining whether the individuals to 
whom they will accrue count equally. For this is a point that he himself emphasizes, 
in the cognate context of distributive justice. In explaining why the Law of Peoples 
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cannot require decent societies to allocate burdens and benefits within their own 
schemes of domestic cooperation according to the principles generated in an original 
position populated by representatives of individuals, Rawls says (p. 70) that the 
original position is only appropriate for determining the claims of equal parties. For 
what would constitute a just distribution of burdens and benefits between equal 
persons will be unjust if their interests do not matter equally. This point applies 
applies just as strongly to the distribution of harms and benefits in war, however. 
 Let us now consider what responses might be available to the problem I am 
posing for GPR. First, a Rawlsian might argue that, although liberal and decent 
peoples do not agree in the first instance on the moral status of the person, a 
determinate, mutually-justifiable position on proportionality might still be available to 
them by consulting the global original position. Representatives of peoples in that 
choice situation would know that the Society of Peoples will need to make collective 
judgements about proportionality, and, one might think, would therefore be inclined 
to agree to some convention for weighing lives. It might even be suggested that, for 
the parties in the original position - deprived as they are of knowledge about the 
conception of justice around which their internal affairs are organized, but aware that 
they have an interest in the security of their members - the default agreement point 
would be on a convention of weighing lives equally for proportionality purposes. 25 
 I do not believe that this suggestion can be correct. Note first that there are, 
strictly speaking, two global original positions described in LoP. In the first, liberal 
peoples endorse the Law of Peoples, and, as needed, debate and agree to its further 
development. In the second, decent peoples do the same. Now, if denizens of the 
                                                        
25 I am grateful to Jonathan Quong for suggesting this line of reply, and to several participants at a 
seminar of the Centre for Ethics, Law and Public Affairs at Warwick for pressing me further on it. 
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first global original position know they are liberal, and are presented with an 
egalitarian proportionality principle, they would seem to have no reason not to adopt 
it, since they are aware that they all accept the equality of the person. But denizens of 
the second global original position do not know how, at the bar of their socially-
regulative doctrine, the moral status of the person is understood. What they do know, 
however, according to Rawls, is that they have a fundamental interest in preserving 
the integrity and stability of that doctrine (see, e.g., p. 29 and p. 33). If they know that 
their interests lie in the preservation of their doctrine, do not know what it 
pronounces on the moral equality of persons, and are asked to endorse a principle of 
equal valuation of civilian lives and interests in war, what would they do? It seems to 
me that they would be unable to reach a decision, owing to the risk that they will 
have seriously undermined their doctrine once the veil is lifted. If this is right, we 
cannot appeal to the global original position to resolve the question of how to weigh 
harms in proportionality calculations, since the problem of indeterminacy infects the 
original position itself. 
 A Rawlsian might reply that failure to agree rules of war would render all 
peoples less secure, and that it is rational for the representatives of decent peoples in 
the original position to subordinate their interests in the preservation and pursuit of 
their doctrines for the sake of security. But this response seems inconsistent with the 
way Rawls depicts the representatives of peoples as conceiving of and reasoning 
about their interests. For those representatives appear to understand their peoples’ 
interests in the preservation of their respective members and territories as derived 
from and conditioned by the commitments of their doctrines. Thus, regarding liberal 
peoples, Rawls writes (p. 34): 
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In thinking of themselves as free and equal, how do peoples… see themselves and 
their fundamental interests? These interests of liberal peoples are specified… by their 
reasonable conception of political justice. Thus, they strive to protect their political 
independence and their free culture with its civil liberties, to guarantee their security, 
territory, and the well-being of their citizens. 
 
And later, regarding decent peoples, Rawls suggests the parallel – that their interests 
are specified by their ‘common good’ conceptions of justice (p. 69). This indicates, 
then, that decent peoples will be viewed by their representatives in the global original 
position not as having an interest in protecting their members that is independent of, 
and capable of being traded off against, their interest in maintaining and 
implementing their doctrines, but as having an interest in protecting their members to 
the degree required under their doctrines, as part of their general interest in pursuing 
those doctrines. Yet, if the representatives of decent peoples see their interests in this 
way, while being deprived of knowledge of the value that their doctrines place on the 
lives and interests of their members, it again appears that they will be unable to come 
to any judgements regarding whether some proposed proportionality rule is 
compatible with their interests or not. 
GPR’s problem of indeterminacy regarding proportionality cannot, then, be 
resolved by recourse to the global original position. This is not yet to say, however, 
that there are no other means (short of resorting to the use of nonpublic reason) by 
which the Society of Peoples can cope with this indeterminacy, and reach satisfactory 
practical decisions regarding whether to authorize or prosecute wars or acts of war. 
Because the literature on GPR is relatively small, and the incompleteness objection 
has not (to my knowledge) previously been pressed against it, the question of how 
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global deliberators might handle cases in which GPR fails to issue sufficient guidance 
on the resolution of political problems has not been considered. However, in the 
more extensive literature on LPR, Rawlsians have argued that, when public reasoning 
‘runs out’, there are a number of decision-making strategies available that enable a 
political community to come to a conclusion concerning how, practically, to proceed, 
without the need for citizens to invoke their comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, Micah 
Schwartzman has identified five such strategies: (1) deferring the decision until later, 
in hope that additional public reasons come to light; (2) deferring to someone else 
who is thought better able to come up with an answer using the available public 
reasons; (3) finding a mutually-acceptable compromise between the opposing 
perspectives; (4) giving up on deliberation, and putting the matter to a democratic 
vote; (5) employing a random decision procedure, like a lottery.26 I believe, however, 
that none of these coping mechanisms would be of assistance to the Society of 
Peoples in the matter at hand. 
 We can, I think, safely discount options (1), (2), and (3). There are no 
additional relevant public reasons that will come to light by waiting, or that some 
parties have privileged access to, to whom others should therefore defer. Nor is this a 
matter that admits of a mutually-acceptable compromise: splitting the difference 
between rival views of the moral worth of the person, even if possible, would only 
lead to conclusions that everyone would find morally repugnant (where by ‘everyone’ I 
mean not only the members of the Society of Peoples themselves, but those who, like 
you and I, are appraising Rawlsian GPR from the perspective of the theorist, and to 
whom its details and implications must be acceptable in reflective equilibrium). 
                                                        
26 Micah Schwartzman, ‘The Completeness of Public Reason’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 3 (2004), 
pp. 191-220, at 209-14. 
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Even if the strategy of compromise were not here morally distasteful, 
moreover, there is a further reason why it cannot help in this particular case – a 
reason which also serves to rule out strategy (4). This is that (3) and (4) are not really 
eligible solutions to indeterminacy in public reason, but only to a somewhat different 
obstacle to decision-making in public reason, known as inconclusiveness. To explain this 
distinction (which is originally due to Gerald Gaus), 27  indeterminacy refers to a 
situation in which, as in the example of proportionality, public reason supports no 
answers to the question asked of it (that is, there are no or insufficient public reasons 
to justify giving an answer). Inconclusiveness, meanwhile, occurs when a number of 
answers can be reached on the basis of the available public reasons, but different 
views obtain regarding which is best, between which public reason fails to adjudicate. 
It is consistent with the Rawlsian ideal of public reason, in both the domestic 
and global contexts, to resolve instances of inconclusiveness by proceeding to a vote, 
or by compromising on a third option that is regarded by the deliberators as better 
than nothing, albeit not optimal. For in such cases, the resultant policy is justified by 
a reasonable balance of public reasons, notwithstanding that some or all parties 
believe another policy to be preferable. Matters are very different, however, in cases 
of indeterminacy. Here there are ex hypothesi no policy options supported by public 
reason alone. To make a decision by majority vote, in these cases, means simply for 
the majority to impose its nonpublic doctrine on the minority, while for opposing 
parties to compromise involves striking a balance between their nonpublic doctrines, 
in a way that Rawls contrasts with the practice of public reasoning, as ‘political in the 
                                                        
27 See Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism (New York, 1996), pp. 151-158. 
 30 
wrong way’.28 In short, then, where proportionality is concerned, strategies (3) and (4) 
fail to uphold the ideal of GPR.  
This leaves only strategy (5). And if this is what Rawlsian deliberators are 
forced to fall back on, all seems lost for GPR. Although there are plausibly some 
political and moral issues that call for the use of random decision procedures, it 
seems impossible not to regard it as a reductio of the Rawlsian view if it requires the 
random resolution of political questions as fundamental as whether the Society of 
Peoples will prosecute, aid, or issue statements of support for wars, in preference to 
resolutions arrived at via the use of ordinary moral reasoning. When what is at stake 
is whether the members of the Society of Peoples will materially contribute to an 
armed conflict, deciding the matter randomly rather than by judgement would be 
intolerably cavalier. And when what is at stake is whether to offer some public 
statement condemning or condoning a war, or the means being employed within it, 
no declaration whose content had been determined randomly would enjoy any 
modicum of moral authority. No belligerent power could feel chastened, for instance, 
to be censured over its conduct in war, if the decision to do so was made through the 
drawing of straws. According to Rawls (pp. 92-3), an important purpose of the Law 
of Peoples, and GPR, is to provide a shared language within which reasonable 
peoples can influence global agents into changing their unethical ways, through moral 
persuasion. The example of proportionality indicates that the theory is a failure in 
those terms. 
To conclude, then, GPR is indeterminate with respect to the important issue 
of proportionality in war. And none of the mechanisms suggested by defenders of 
LPR can be imported to adequately alleviate this problem. That GPR should struggle 
                                                        
28 See Political Liberalism, e.g. at p. xlv. 
 31 
with an issue of such centrality to the ethics of war seems fatal in itself. As I argue 
next, however, GPR suffers from another war-related defect that is at least as serious. 
 
V. INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION 
As we have seen throughout this paper, the Law of Peoples is a conception of 
international justice under which peoples, not persons, are the primary loci of 
concern and respect, and the agents to whom its principles issue injunctions to act. 
Because the Law of Peoples provides the content of GPR, these features of the 
conception produce a framework for deliberation that is highly inhospitable towards 
the pursuit of cosmopolitan moral concerns. For they ensure that arguments 
regarding fairness in the meeting of individual interests across borders, and how far 
persons may owe duties directly to each other to promote and protect each other’s 
well-being, cannot even be raised in the global public forum, much less acted upon. 
 Even as a defender of Rawls, Leif Wenar acknowledges that the people-centric 
nature of the Law of Peoples ‘comes at a price.’29 ‘Because Rawls’s global theory 
works exclusively in terms of peoples’, he writes, ‘it cannot show any direct concern 
for individuals.’ 30  Even when the Law of Peoples prescribes humanitarian 
intervention in an outlaw regime, or material aid in burdened societies, 
 
the intervention is not for the sake of the well-being of the oppressed or the starving… 
It is as if societies were individuals, with their members being merely the cells of their 
bodies, and one society intervened to give medical treatment to another to enable it to 
                                                        
29 See Leif Wenar, ‘Why Rawls is not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian’, in Rawls’s Law of Peoples, eds. Rex 
Martin and and David A. Reidy (Oxford, 2006), pp. 95-113, at 104. 
30 Wenar, ‘Why Rawls’, p. 104. 
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rejoin the scheme of social cooperation… The law of peoples orders the relations 
among peoples, and therefore leaves the interests of individuals as an indirect and 
rather attenuated concern.31 
 
According to Wenar, however, while the Law of Peoples may seem, from a 
cosmopolitan perspective, ‘disappointingly conservative’ 32  – especially in its 
opposition to egalitarian global redistribution - it is vindicated overall by providing 
what Wenar sees as an attractive - indeed indispensable - practical account of war and 
security. 
 Wenar’s defence of Rawls first emphasizes his commitment to public 
justification, arguing that the Law of Peoples centres on relations between peoples 
not persons because the global public culture from which it must, as a political 
conception of justice, be derived, is itself ‘primarily international, not interpersonal.’ 33 
‘There simply is no robust global public political culture’, Wenar claims, ‘which 
emphasizes that citizens of different countries ought to relate fairly to one another.’34 
Wenar then contends that, even if we regret that Rawls’s approach to the justification 
of global principles of justice is not more conducive to a cosmopolitan economic 
agenda, we should nonetheless accept that (a) the goals of international peace and 
stability are prior to distributive justice, and (b) absent a world state, the principles of 
war needed to achieve these goals will be, as in the Law of Peoples, ‘inescapably 
                                                        
31 Wenar, ‘Why Rawls’, p. 104, emphasis in original. 
32 Wenar, ‘Why Rawls’, p. 106. 
33 Wenar, ‘Why Rawls’, p. 103, emphasis in original. 
34 Wenar, ‘Why Rawls’, p. 103. 
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statist.’35 By this, Wenar means that these principles will grant particular sovereign 
peoples responsibility over identifiable territories, and rights to defend them 
militarily. Statism of that kind, Wenar avers, underpins the existing laws of war and 
traditional just war doctrine, and its adoption within the Law of Peoples is warranted 
because it represents ‘the only realized approach to global political morality that we 
have.’36 
There is a serious problem, however, with Wenar’s invocation of the just war 
tradition in defence of the Law of Peoples.37 For the Law of Peoples is statist in a far 
more radical sense than traditional just war doctrine. To be sure, Walzer’s influential 
presentation of the just war position employs the so-called ‘domestic analogy’, 
whereby nations are seen as having rights to defend their borders against aggressive 
regimes that mirror the rights of citizens to defend their homes against intruders. 38 
But the tradition is not committed to thinking of war as if states were the only actors 
involved, and nor are its principles addressed exclusively to nations or peoples as 
collective actors. On the contrary, the theory holds that persons, even if they are not 
in a position to influence whether their group goes to war, or what overall strategy it 
pursues, are still individually subject to the rules of jus in bello, and morally answerable 
for their acts and omissions. The Law of Peoples, by contrast, addresses all its 
                                                        
35 Wenar, ‘Why Rawls’, p. 110. 
36 Wenar, ‘Why Rawls’, p. 111. 
37 Wenar contends (at pp. 108-9) that, since any viable theory of global justice must assign states a 
right to defend their territories, principles of right conduct in war must accordingly identify who may 
permissibly be killed partly on the basis of political and territorial affiliation. He refers in this context 
to ‘principles for individuals’, implying that he may think the Law of Peoples after all includes – or 
could be extended to include – such principles. Yet this is not so, for the reasons given in section II. 
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principles, including its in bello requirements, to peoples, acting collectively through 
their institutions, and thus speaks to individuals at best only indirectly, in so far as 
they are responsible, as office holders of one sort or another, for enacting their 
people’s will, or carrying out its duties. It does not, then, speak to the question of 
what individuals, acting on their own initiative, or in an uncoordinated way, may or 
must do in war. Far from showing fidelity to traditional just war theory, then, the 
structure of the Law of Peoples results in the excision of the traditional theory’s 
commitment to the moral appraisal of individual wartime conduct. 
This means that claims on the world stage to the effect that particular 
individual participants in war (whether members of a people that is a party to the war, 
of a people outside the conflict, or indeed of no people at all) acted wrongly by 
engaging in such-and-such acts of unjust harming or refusals to save, cannot be 
genuine expressions of GPR. To be sure, given that peoples are subject to in bello duties 
under the Law of Peoples, they must exercise control over their soldiers (and 
members more generally), and can be condemned within the terms of GPR for 
allowing them to go off the rails. Yet suppose that a people, through its government, 
pursues a military strategy consonant with jus in bello, and puts in place all due 
precautions against violations of civilian immunity etc. by its members. If, 
nonetheless, some of them, acting spontaneously, carry out wrongful intentional 
attacks on civilians, GPR does not provide the language within which to condemn 
their behaviour, since the agents to whom its principles are addressed acted in full 
compliance with their obligations. 
Because claims about individual wrongdoing fall outside the remit of GPR, 
Rawls’s theory withholds a special status from them: that of having normative 
authority cross-culturally, such that they cannot be reasonably dismissed as an artifact 
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of some particular parochial doctrine or outlook. Yet, whilst there is, of course, room 
for reasonable disagreement (in a non-technical sense) over the precise content of the 
duties that apply to individuals in war, it is unacceptable to deny that any such duties 
apply to them. Of course, GPR does not, strictly speaking, deny that individuals in war 
are under their own moral duties – it merely refuses to register or pursue that 
question. In so doing, however, it unfortunately implies that the view that there are 
no such duties is reasonable, and fails to provide members of the Society of Peoples 
with the conceptual and argumentative resources needed to publicly challenge or 
repudiate that position. 
It is not sufficient consolation that, whilst individual activity in war cannot be 
directly morally criticized in GPR, governments remain free to morally educate their 
citizens about their wartime obligations under their homegrown moral or religious 
doctrines, and indeed sanction them for violations. For even if liberal and decent 
peoples do so, this leaves untouched persons living in badly-ordered societies, who 
are at greater risk of seeing war, and whose leadership and culture may well reject the 
idea that there are wartime moral duties for individuals, or take a repugnant view of 
what those duties are (‘kill as many unbelievers as you can’, say).  
 Nor is it sufficient consolation that, despite the gap I have exhibited in its 
content, GPR is nonetheless capable of justifying the prosecution, under international 
criminal law, of individuals who commit war-related crimes. To be clear, GPR can 
make the case for such prosecutions. What it cannot do, however, is justify them in 
the most intuitively powerful or commonsense fashion: as the enforcement of some 
of the most stringent duties of justice to which persons are individually subject – not 
to kill, maim, rape, and so forth - and which they owe to each other. In GPR, the 
justification for this legal practice must instead be that it is necessary to the protection 
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of the interests of peoples, who would insist, in an appropriate choice situation, on its 
being part of the global basic structure. That is a rather morally anaemic defence of 
such an important feature of international law. Worse, it may even undermine the 
basis of respect for that law. For it seems misleadingly to imply that the law 
instrumentalizes those whom it targets, for the sake of the interests of peoples as 
collective entities, by punishing them for acts from which, as far as could be gleaned 
from the pronouncements of the international community, they were under no 
personal duty to refrain. 
In sum, GPR is silent over what justice demands of individuals in war. But 
that silence implicitly says something, and that something is unacceptable: that it is not 
unreasonable to deny that persons are under any individual duties of justice when 
they take part in armed conflict. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued for the rejection of Rawlsian GPR, on grounds that it fails to 
provide a deliberative framework within which participants can conduct determinate 
assessments of proportionality, or affirm acceptable answers regarding the ethical 
status of the wartime conduct of individual as well as collective agents. These 
problems arise because the Rawlsian model refuses, on grounds of respect for non-
liberal perspectives, to address the question of whether persons matter equally, and 
because, in consequence, its content is restricted to that given by a theory of global 
justice whose moral requirements are exclusively levelled at peoples. These features 
of the Rawlsian model are essential planks of its anti-cosmopolitanism. Hence, any 
conception of GPR that aims to avoid these deficiencies would need to be more 
accommodating of cosmopolitan ideals, by permitting public appeal to arguments 
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about interpersonal equality, and about justice as a property of global interpersonal 
relations. Indeed, if the new model were still to have the character of a consensus-based 
mode of reasoning (i.e. one in which justification proceeds on the basis of shared or 
shareable reasons), then the constituency of the reasonable would have to be 
contracted to encompass only perspectives that affirm these cosmopolitan ideas. This 
is not to say, of course, that a model of GPR conforming to these requirements 
would necessarily be satisfactory, or free of other, decisive objections. We can, 
however, say that we have identified what would be the outer edge of reasonable 
pluralism under any potentially viable theory of GPR. Rawls’s extension of the 
justificatory community from liberal to inegalitarian decent worldviews is 
incompatible, I conclude, with developing a conception of GPR that is fit for the 
practical purpose of addressing and resolving the problems of war.39 
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